Des de una con cep ción po si ti vis ta del de re cho y su res pec ti vo en fo que ha cia la in ter pre ta ción ju rí di ca, en este ar tícu lo se ar gu men ta que el tener un "Bill of Rights de mo crá ti co" como base para ex pe dir una "le gis lación de de re chos hu ma nos" re sul ta ser más le gí ti mo y más efec ti vo para la pro mo ción de los de re chos hu ma nos, que el mo de lo con tem po rá neo de "Bill of Rights ju ris dic cio na les" que sir ve para mo di fi car o in va li dar la legis la ción pro mul ga da. 
The ba sic dem o cratic case against a ju rid i cal bill of rights is straight for ward and long stand ing: it is an in sti tu tion that gives the last word on some of the most im por tant is sues of state to a small group of in di vid u als who are un rep re sen tative in the tech ni cal sense that they are not elected by a pro cess of uni ver sal suf frage in a po lit i cally free so ci ety (Bickel 1986 , Waldron 1999 , Tushnet 1999 , Kramer 2004 ). This mode of rule is quite sim ply in com pat i ble with the univer sal right to self-de ter mi na tion, ei ther on the part of in divid u als or po lit i cal group ings. In prac tice, of course, courts are wisely con strained in their use of the ju di cial over ride, for its rou tine use would ex pose its dem o cratic il le git i macy. Yet, to the ex tent that the ju rid i cal over ride is used it is a dim i nu tion of de facto de moc racy and the very existence of such a mechanism is a negation of de jure democracy.
There is, of course, a host of coun ter-ar gu ments to this 'countermajoritarian' cri tique of the ju di cial over ride of legis la tion, in clud ing the most com pel ling ar gu ment: that democ racy has to be pro tected against it self, for might not a dem o cratic de ci sion be made, for in stance, to re duces or even abol ish de moc racy? In deed, in the terms of my own po si tion, is this not pre cisely what hap pens when a dem ocratic vote pro duces a Bill of Rights with the ju di cial power to in val i date such leg is la tion as is deemed by the court to violate these rights.
The need to pro tect de moc racy against it self is one version of a type of ar gu ment that re quires us to ac cept that the moral le git i macy of a gov ern ment de pends not sim ply on who makes po lit i cal de ci sions but the con se quences of these de ci sions. More par tic u larly, le git i ma tion de pends on out comes and not only, for in stance, on con sent or par tic ipa tion. The as sump tion is that, if elected as sem blies produce bad out comes they could rea son ably be re placed or con strained by institutions that produce better ones.
It is tempt ing to re spond to out come ori ented as sessments of le git i macy with an af fir ma tion of a deontological right to self-de ter mi na tion that is in de pend ent of the re -267 sults it pro duces. In di vid u als and cer tain col lec tivi ties of indi vid u als, it is ar gued have the right to make cer tain de cisions as they choose, not be cause they will choose wisely or rightly, but be cause it is their right to make the choice, whether or not they make it well or badly. In deed, is this not a ba sic hu man right, per haps the ba sic right? Well, certainly, some form of deontologically based au ton omy rights must fea ture in any plau si ble jus ti fi ca tory dem o cratic theory, both in or der to jus tify for bid ding pa ter nal is tic in terven tion in the peo ple's pri vate lives, and as a de ci sive fac tor in the po lit i cal le git i ma tion of dem o cratic pro cess in the deter mi na tion of con tro ver sial moral questions where there is no consensus as to what the best outcomes are.
How ever, there are ma jor consequentialist in puts to the jus ti fi ca tion and de lin ea tion of most if not all rights, hu man and oth er wise, and no po lit i cal sys tem can be le git i mated en tirely with out ref er ence to its con se quences, even if these con se quences are con fined to the ex tent to which other rights are re spected. In deed the his tor i cally most pow er ful ar gu ment for uni ver sal fran chise in a rep re sen ta tive sys tem of gov er nance is that this is a nec es sary pre con di tion of pro tect ing and pro mot ing the in ter ests of the peo ple as a whole against oth er wise in ev i ta ble op pres sion by pow er ful mi nor ity groups. There fore, we must take ac count, for instance, of the ex tent to which ma jor ity gov ern ment may harm ma jor i ties, or the way in which some lim i ta tions on majoritarianism might ben e fit the ma jor ity it self. A for ti ori, this anal y sis ap plies to the rel e vance of the out comes of majoritiarian vot ing sys tems not so much for those who voted the other way (for that is an in ev i ta ble con se quence of making each vote count equally) as those who suffer unfairly as a result of the decision made.
I ac knowl edge, there fore, that the case for the pure democ racy of the sov er eignty of the peo ple (or in ef fect a major ity of the peo ple) over against the lim i ta tions of con sti tutional de moc racy, with its mech a nism of ju di cial re view, is based on a mix ture of the equal deontological au ton omy 268 rights of hu man in di vid ual and so ci et ies, and consequentialist claims that such a sys tem at least ad e quately protects the gen eral wellbeing of a so ci ety in a man ner that is fairer (more equal) than al ter na tive sys tems. It fol lows that the at tempt to jus tify "pure" de moc racy must be open in prin ci ple to the view that some lim i ta tions to dem o cratic process might be jus ti fi able. In par tic u lar, the dem o cratic case against judicial re view must take both the pro tect ing democ racy ar gu ment and the pro tect ing op pressed mi nor i ties ar gu ment very se ri ously.
That said, the main thrust of the dem o cratic case must be that ju di cial re view on the ba sis of bills of rights is per se anti-dem o cratic be cause its ex er cise is an ex er cise of sov er eign leg is la tive power that un der mines the deontic auton omy rights of the peo ple and lim its their ca pac ity to protect their in ter ests, and that the strong bur den of proof that falls on those who wish to limit dem o cratic rights in this way has not been met.
So much for gen eral back ground. My par tic u lar con cern in this pa per is that the fact that the le git i ma tion de bate out lined above is of ten side-stepped by the ar gu ment that strong bill of rights-based ju di cial re view is not a usur pation of the sov er eign right of the peo ple to make law af ter all, be cause it is a mat ter of in ter pret ing, not mak ing. Bill of Rights are, let us as sume, en dorsed by the peo ple, and courts are merely car ry ing out their du ties of in ter pret ing and ap ply ing the rights that the peo ple have en dorsed. There is, there fore, no dem o cratic def i cit and no strong burden of proof to be met in or der to jus tify Bills of Rights. It is an un con tro ver sial in gre di ent in the model of con sti tu tional de moc racy out lined above that the peo ple, or their elected rep re sen ta tive, make the law, while an in de pend ent (and that means, inter alia, not sub ject to the pres sures of re-elec tion) ju di ciary in ter prets and ap plies the laws that the peo ple have, di rectly or in di rectly, made. The logic of the ar gu ment, as set out in Marbury v Mad i son, is that, accord ing to the con sen sual doc trine of the di vi sion of power 269 the courts have the right, nay the duty, to apply such rights as the popularly validated constitution contains.
This takes us to the cen tral topic of this pa per: 'in ter preting' Bills of Rights. Or, more spe cif i cally, what I con sider to be the false claim that the pro cess of trans form ing ab stract rights into con crete law is prop erly taken to be one of le gal in ter pre ta tion. I ar gue that Bills of rights, be cause of, or inso far as, they are in gen eral con sti tuted by vague af fir mations in value-laden terms, can not be ap plied to par tic u lar cases with out mak ing judg ments that are pri mar ily moral and po lit i cal (and there fore ideo log i cal) rather than in terpre tive in the legally appropriate sense of that word.
This the sis may be dis missed as a se man tic point about a word ('in ter pre ta tion') whose mean ing is ob scure, fluid and con tested. I am not, how ever, re ly ing on an al leg edly neutral anal y sis of the dis course of in ter pre ta tion, al though it is im por tant that what ever sense we give to the term in legal con texts is not rad i cally con fus ing to or di nary us ers of the ter mi nol ogy. What is re quired is a the ory of le gal in terpre ta tion that is de rived from a par tic u lar view of the nature and pur pose of law. My con clu sions as to le gal in terpre ta tion are not de rived from any 'cor rect' gen eral anal y sis of 'in ter pre ta tion' and do not want to rest my case sim ply on an ap peal to any of its dis tinc tive or ex tended uses. In par tic u lar, I would re sist at tempts to use anal y ses of lit erary or mu si cal or sci en tific in ter pre ta tion to draw con clusions about le gal in ter pre ta tion. Rather, what is re quired is a theory of law that justifies what should count as interpretation in a legal context. What I have in mind here is a ver sion of le gal pos i tiv ism that sees law as ide ally a co her ent set of clear and followable rules that can be un der stood with out re course to spec u la tive or con test able judg ments or opin ions. This posi tiv ist con cep tion of laws is linked to an as so ci ated ideal of the rule of law whereby power ought to be ex er cised over other peo ple only through the me dium of such positivistically good laws. Im por tantly the moral ar gu ments in fa -270 vour of such a po lit i cal sys tem are not only those of fairness and ef fi ciency out lined by Lon Fuller (1969) but also a fun da men tal sov er eignty ar gu ment to the ef fect that strong uni tary rule re quires such a sys tem, an anal y sis that explains why pure dem o crats es pouse the rule of pos i tive law as an es sen tial pre req ui site of dem o cratic sov er eignty. The the sis of what may be called 'dem o cratic pos i tiv ism' is that law is a sys tem of rules ex press ing the will of the peo ple as to how in di vid u als must or may con duct them selves in their so cial in ter ac tions (Camp bell 1996) . Along with this goes the rec om men da tions that laws ought to be framed in gen eral but spe cific terms that can be un der stood and put into prac tice with out re quir ing those con cerned to make their own moral judg ments as to the na ture and pro pri ety of the con duct them selves. For this to op er ate sat is fac to rily, cit i zens in gen eral and those who make au thor i ta tive judgments in cases of dis putes about the rules, must fol low the plain con tex tual mean ing of the rules and en gage only in such in ter pre ta tion of the rules as is de signed to clar ify and pub li cise agreed un der stand ings of the rules in those minor ity of cases where a good faith read ing of the text and ac ces si ble un der stand ing of the con text is not suf fi cient to en gen der an ev i dent pub lic mean ing for the rules in question (Camp bell 2004: 247-297) . In other words, in a de mocracy, citizens have a right to expect that the rules which they must or may follow are properly understood in accordance with tier publicly available meaning.
"In ter pre ta tion" may, in stan dard dis course, have a generic con no ta tion which may be summed up as the ac tiv ity of giv ing a par tic u lar mean ing to a text or hap pen ing that is ca pa ble of be ing un der stood in a va ri ety of ways, but the cri te ria for what counts as an in ter pre ta tion and what counts as a good in ter pre ta tion vary con sid er ably ac cord ing to the na ture of the sub ject mat ter be ing in ter preted and the ob jec tive of the in ter pre ta tion in ques tion. While it might of ten be il lu mi nat ing to com pare what counts as inter pre ta tion in dif fer ent spheres and how in ter pre ta tions 271 are eval u ated in these spheres Levinson and Mailloux), there can be no prior as sump tion that what holds in one sphere can be trans ferred to an other. The pro cess of in terpret ing a lit er ary text may or may not over lap with what goes on in the in ter pre ta tion of sci en tific data (per haps "sim plic ity" might be a cri te rion of a good in ter pre ta tion in both spheres) but the fact that a the ory of in ter pre ta tion holds good in sci ence says noth ing in it self about whether it has ap pli ca tion to lit er a ture, or to law. And so, while the require ment of con ven tional in tel li gi bil ity re quires that we do not give an id io syn cratic mean ing to "in ter pre ta tion" in the sphere of law, we can not de duce any thing of sub stance from gen eral theories of interpretation to generate a theory as to what legal interpretation is or ought to be (contra Fish 1994 and Raz 1998) .
On the other hand, le gal in ter pre ta tion is not a purely tech ni cal mat ter about which we can learn by study ing text books about the in ter pre ta tion of stat utes, cases and consti tu tions. Fa mil iar ity with such ma te rial is, of course, a nec es sary pre con di tion of re flect ing on le gal in ter pre ta tion but such ma te rial is not de fin i tive ei ther in de lin eat ing the con cep tual bound aries of what is to count as "le gal in terpre ta tion" or in de ter min ing what should count as a good le gal in ter pre ta tion. Such is sues can not be set tled ei ther by con cep tual clar i fi ca tion drawn from the anal y sis of le gal dis course or from a study of le gal texts, text books or practice. Rather they must be seen as part of a the ory of law and pol i tics that is both de scrip tive of what le gal sys tems can be like and pre scrip tive as to what, within these po tenti al i ties, they ought to be like. Thus both the con cep tual and nor ma tive bound aries of le gal in ter pre ta tion will vary dra mat i cally as be tween le gal positivists, le gal re al ists and nat u ral law yers. A le gal posi tiv ist might ar gue that le gal inter pre ta tion is about how best to un der stand a law when there is an am bi gu ity or unclarity in a le gal text. As such it is dif fer ent from un der stand ing a text which is un am big uous and clear, and dif fer ent from chang ing a text in or der 272 to ar rive at a mean ing that is not one of the range of pos sibil i ties that could be given to the text in terms of the linguis tic prac tices of its in tended au di ence. Le gal re al ists reject the bases on which the positivists dis tinc tion be tween un der stand ing, in ter pre ta tion and tex tual change are based, tak ing the po si tion that dis course is not ca pa ble of be ing sub jected to such cate go ri sa tions since all words and sen tences can be and are of ten un der stood in rad i cally differ ent ways by dif fer ent in di vid u als, groups and cul tures, thus ren der ing le gal and other rules and sen tences con geni tally in de ter mi nate. Nat u ral law yers may hold, in con trast to both positivists and re al ists, that lan guage re lates to a deeper re al ity the un der stand ing of which is a nec es sary part of breath ing mean ing into dis course so that the process of in ter pre ta tion involves an understanding of nature and goodness that cannot be derived from mechanical rules of interpretive practices that are insulated from the wider role of reason and experience in understanding nature.
Choos ing be tween such ab stract the o ries is a dif fi cult and com plex busi ness but the out comes are re plete with prac ti cal im pli ca tions for the way in which we con ceive of law and put that con cep tion into prac tice. This is so, in part, be cause within the le gal cul ture that is more or less shared by positivists, re al ists and nat u ral law yers, it is under stood that "in ter pre ta tion" is a le git i mate, nec es sary and core ac tiv ity for judges. This does not mean that le gal in terpre ta tion is a prac tice that is con fined to ju di cia ries. Law is ad dressed in the first place to all those who are sub ject to it and a mea sure of in ter pre ta tion is to be ex pected, what ever gen eral the ory is at work. But it does mean that the in terpre ta tions of judges are au thor i ta tive when it co mes to of ficial de ci sion-mak ing as to the ap pli ca tion of laws to par ticu lar cir cum stances. The o ries vary as to whether ju di cial ac tiv ity be yond fact-find ing is con fined to un der stand ing and/or in ter pret ing laws, but all agreed that, what ever is a mat ter of in ter pre ta tion that is a mat ter as to which the judges in ques tion have the fi nal say, at least un til such 273 time as the laws in ques tion are changed. In this con text, and on these as sump tions, it is no won der that the meaning of 'le gal in ter pre ta tion' is con tested for this is caught up in the de bate about what is and what is not legitimate in judicial reasoning, which in turn alters whose decisions carry most weight within that political system.
It is clear that the cri tique of bills of rights out lined above pre sup poses some thing like a le gal posi tiv ist view of le gal in ter pre ta tion. It as sumes the su pe rior pro pri ety of a system of law in which there are clear, un am big u ous and reason ably spe cific rules that can be un der stood in terms of their plain mean ing in stan dard con texts, and which cit izens and in gen eral judges may un der stand and fol low with out draw ing on any thing that is con tro ver sial with respect to their fac tual and moral be liefs. Of course le gal posi tiv ism co mes in a va ri ety of forms with rad i cally dif fer ent con tents. In its weaker forms all that is re quired is that valid laws can be iden ti fied by ref er ence to a so cial source that can it self be iden ti fied with out uti lis ing moral or other spec u la tive judg ments. But the ra tio nales for adopt ing this weakly posi tiv ist view of law, such as the proper func tioning of sov er eign power, ap ply not only to the iden ti fi ca tion of what valid law is but also to the un der stand ing and inter pre ta tion of that which is so iden ti fied. The ad van tages of clar ity, in tel li gi bil ity, de fin i tive ness, prospectivity, and so on can be achieved only if laws can be neu trally iden ti fied and neu trally un der stood. In other words, the logic posi tivist model out lined above is un equiv o cally exclusionary, in terms of the accepted distinction between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism (Waluchow 1994) . Now all this is too much to swal low if we re gard such theo ries as le gal pos i tiv ism ei ther as mat ters of de tached concep tual anal y sis of the mean ing of "law", or as hav ing to do with em pir i cal ob ser va tion and de scrip tion of what are com monly ac knowl edged to be some form of le gal sys tem. It is not part of the mean ing of 'law' that it is strongly posi tivist, or part of the find ing of le gal so cial sci ence that all or 274 most, or in deed any of what count as le gal sys tems ac tu ally con form to the posi tiv ist model to any par tic u lar de gree. How ever the mode of le gal theo ris ing that mat ters here are pre scrip tive or nor ma tive ones which, al though they assume cer tain work ing def i ni tions of terms such as "law" which are broad enough to iden tify a broad range of as so ciated phe nom ena, are ac tu ally ad dressed to the ques tion of what con sti tutes "good" law, not in terms of the par tic u lar sub stance of law, but in terms of its formal characteristics, such as specificity, clarity and consistency.
It is not my task in this pa per to de fend strong pre scriptive le gal pos i tiv ism but sim ply to point out that some such po si tion is pre sup posed in my dem o cratic cri tique of courtcen tred bills of rights. How ever it is worth men tion ing that, while the posi tiv ist ar gu ments for adopt ing a posi tiv ist model of law do not di rectly in voke de moc racy, le gal pos i tivism does play an im por tant part in the jus ti fi ca tion of democ racy con ceived of as rule by the peo ple as it is not fea sible to con ceive of a sit u a tion in which a large num ber of peo ple en gage in self-gov er nance un less they do so by way of positivistically good laws. Only if the laws that are adopted through dem o cratic pro cess match the posi tiv ist cri te ria of good rules and are ap plied by way of a type of inter pre ta tion that fits the posi tiv ist model can we say that the peo ple ac tu ally have some con trol over the gov er nance of a pol ity. De moc racy requires positivism even if positivism does not require democracy.
II. THE PROPOSAL
That said I want now to raise the ques tion of how a strong pre scrip tive le gal posi tiv ist can ap proach the business of im ple ment ing the sort of hu man rights that fea ture in bills of rights, that is rights to life, to prop erty, to a fair trial, to the equal pro tec tion of the law, and yes, so cial and eco nomic rights, such as the right to a de cent stan dard of liv ing, a right to ba sic med i cal care, and so on. My the sis is 275 that these rights, ab stractly stated, are not the ma te rial for positivistically good laws. They there fore have no place in a dem o cratic sys tem of law. This goes with the claim that there can be no sat is fac tory the ory of le gal in ter pre ta tion in a dem o cratic pol ity that can be de vised to ac com mo date the pres ence of ab stract state ments of rights in its cor pus. Hence the in sol u ble de bates that take place to es tab lish an ac cept able ju di cial method of the in ter pre ta tion of the U.S. Bill of rights, where the choice on of fer is es sen tially between rec om men da tions of overtly free rang ing moral reason ing (Dworkin 1996) and un con vinc ing mod els of orig i nal in tent that are sim ply un able to cope with trans lat ing the broad ter mi nol ogy of 18th. cen tury rights to the very dif ferent con text of 21st. cen tury Amer ica. While the lat ter approach (Scalia 1989 , Goldstein 1990 ) While the lat ter has the vir tue of be ing ap pro pri ate, with modification, to statutory interpretation it lack plausibility with respect to typical Bills of Rights.
Nev er the less, ab stract and highly gen eral Bills of Rights can serve many use ful pur poses. One of these is to pro vide a start ing point for po lit i cal de bate around the choice and jus ti fi ca tion of for mally good laws. The right to life can aid the de bate about what would con sti tute a positivistically good law of ho mi cide as well as to a positivistically sat is factory health care law. That is, it is pos si ble to uti lise Bills of Rights in se lect ing what might be called hu man rights leg isla tion, that is leg is la tion which is de signed to di rectly imple ment hu man rights prin ci ples. How ever, the pro cess of mov ing from prin ci ple to rule is not a pro cess of in ter pre tation but of leg is la tion and as such, is to be con ducted not ac cord ing to de bates as to tex tual anal y sis, es tab lished prece dent and le gal prin ci ple, but in terms of po lit i cal de bate as to more pre cisely what it is that we value, more pre cisely what we think is eco nom i cally and so cio log i cally fea si ble, and more pre cisely about what we can en gen der a suf fi cient measure of agreement to satisfy at least a majority of the affected population.
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The sug ges tion that I want to ex plore as an al ter na tive to court-ad min is tered Bills of Rights I call a "dem o cratic Bill of Rights", not be cause such a Bill would be con cerned only with dem o cratic rights, al though they would most cer tainly fea ture, but be cause of the func tion it could ful fil within a dem o cratic po lit i cal pro cess. A dem o cratic bill of rights sets forth the aims and lim i ta tions of le git i mate gov ern ment as en dorsed by the elec tor ate af ter ex ten sive ex po sure and debate. To this point it can be viewed as a purely po lit i cal state ment of po lit i cal val ues with no di rect le gal im pli cations: a po lit i cal char ter, not a le gal doc u ment. How ever, the point of hav ing such a Bill is that it should play a part in an in ter re lated set of pro ce dures that are de signed to assist de moc ra cies to con front and deal with the cri tiques of majoritarianism that are made by those who sup port what may be called an un dem o cratic Bills of Rights. It is not my pur pose in this pa per to set out this scheme in any de tail. The mech a nisms I have in mind are (per haps constitutionalized) ob li ga tions to en act hu man rights leg is la tion, and to sub ject all pro spec tive and ex ist ing leg is la tion to the scru tiny of hu man rights com mit tees drawn from the member ship of elected as sem blies (Kinley 200, Hiebert 1998) and to have an in de pend ent hu man rights com mis sion with the re sources to in ves ti gate hu man rights is sues and the power to have them given ex po sure in Par lia men tary agendas. The im por tant fea ture about hu man rights leg is la tion, apart from the fact that its con tent is in tended to be de rived from hu man rights prin ci ples, is that it con forms to a positivistic ideal of the prin ci ple of le gal ity ac cord ing to which po lit i cal power can only be ex er cised through the me dium of rules that can be stated, un der stood, and im plemented with out re course to moral rea son ing with re spect to iden ti fy ing their con tent. Hu man rights leg is la tion is leg isla tion in the sense that it is ame na ble to le gal in ter pre tation in the sense out lined above. It fol lows, of course, that stat u tory Bills of Rights are by and large not examples of human rights legislation because they do not qualify as 277 legislation, at least with regard to the identification of the rights contained therein.
That said, there is no rea son why hu man rights leg is lation should not be given a spe cial sta tus within the wider cor pus of or di nary leg is la tion and the rem nants of such com mon law as sur vives the de vel op ment of dem o cratic account abil ity. Hu man rights leg is la tion can be used to give jus ti cia ble con tent to the idea that fun da men tal rights should not be sub ject to im plied over rul ing by later leg is lation. In deed the con ven tion could be adopted that hu man rights leg is la tion must be ex plic itly amended and not subject to re vi sion by even clear and ex plicit pro vi sions in or dinary leg is la tion. In this case or di nary leg is la tion is valid only if it is com pat i ble with ex ist ing human rights legislation (Factortame No. 2; Eskridge and Ferejohn 2001) .
Such a scheme may ap pear rather sim i lar to those weaker ver sions of con sti tu tional de moc racy that in volve bills of rights prin ci pally to guide courts in the in ter pre tation of the law, such as the UK Hu man Rights Act 1998 and the New Zea land Bill of Rights 1990, which en cour age or re quire courts to in ter pret leg is la tion so that it is compat i ble with a cer tain list of enu mer ated rights, such as, in the case of the UK Act, the Eu ro pean Convention on Human Rights. How ever, de spite some su per fi cial sim i lar i ties, the two schemes are rad i cally dif fer ent. What may be called in terpre tive bills of rights re quire courts to un der take a form of rea son ing that goes far be yond the proper bounds of le gal in ter pre ta tion. As crib ing ap pro pri ate con tent to the abstract rights in ques tion, al though it can even tu ally be reduced to a pro cess of fol low ing pre ce dents, de pends es sentially on set ting pre ce dents by mak ing value judg ments of a sort that are only loosely re lated to the texts in ques tion. Fur ther the pro cess or bal anc ing the sig nif i cance of these rights, so de fined, against what is to count as rea son able re stric tions in the pur suit of le git i mate state ends, is it self es sen tially a po lit i cal not a le gal judg ment. Fi nally the per -278 mis sion or re quire ment that the leg is la tion in ques tion should be 'in ter preted', if pos si ble, so as to be com pat i ble with the de lin eated and bal anced hu man rights, per mits or re quires de part ing from the authorised text to an ex tent that goes be yond in ter pre ta tion to re writ ing through reading down or read ing in con sid er ations that do not fol low from the much more limited range of interpretive possibilities that arise from the existence of obscurities and ambiguities.
In a sys tem of in ter pre tive Bills of Rights, any prelegislative scru tiny that oc curs tends to be con ducted in terms of an tic i pat ing what courts might say about the leg isla tion in ques tion. The com mit tee de bate is not there fore the sort of moral and po lit i cal de bate that is needed to explore the ques tion of what our hu man rights are or should be. Whereas a dem o cratic bill of rights would pro vide the moral ba sis for a leg is la tive style de bate of a very dif fer ent na ture in that it would not be couched in terms of le gal prece dent and le gal pre dic tion. A hu man rights scru tiny commit tee that is not try ing to sec ond guess what courts might say about pur ported leg is la tion but is ac tu ally en gag ing in moral and po lit i cal de bate as to what par tic u lar hu man rights are or ought to be and how they are best im plemented in prac tice is a very dif fer ent body from one that is seek ing to make leg is la tion proof against the more le gal is tic but also highly po lit i cal judg ments of courts that may be called upon to pro nounce on the va lid ity, ap pli ca bil ity or 'in ter pre ta tion' of the leg is la tion in ques tion. More over, they would not come up against the prob lem, emerg ing as the UK Hu man Rights Act gets un der way, of the leg is la tion in ques tion be ing ef fec tively re drafted to make it com pat i ble with the Eu ro pean Con ven tion on Hu man Rights and its ever de vel op ing case law. As in New Zea land, the rather loose ter mi nol ogy of the stat u tory bills in ques tion has encour aged courts to take lib er ties with the text of or di nary leg is la tion in or der to better serve the purpose of imple-279 menting their un der stand ing of fun da men tal hu man rights (Allan 2003) .
The gen er ous not to say cre ative ways in which courts have used what has been called 'weak' ju di cial re view so as to turn it ef fec tively into some thing akin to 'strong' ju di cial re view (Camp bell 2001) has been jus ti fied by a grow ing inter na tional ju di cial con sen sus that hu man rights in struments are 'dif fer ent' in that they must be read and de veloped in a pro gres sive way to better ful fil their func tion of pro mot ing hu man rights. It has be come an ac cepted prin ciple of in ter pret ing in ter pre tive bills of rights that this is a pro cess that should be car ried out 'lib er ally' in or der to give max i mal pro tec tion to hu man rights (Ng Ka Ling v Di rec tor of Im mi gra tion [1999] 1 HKLR, 315, 339-40; R. v Sec re tary of State for the Home De part ment, ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33 (8 July) 1 at 9.) This has en cour aged courts to go far be yond the texts of their bills of rights, even to the point of in tro duc ing in no va tions that were ex plic itly ex cluded from the Bills of Rights that they are meant to be im plement ing. In the case of strong ju di cial re view with an entrenched bill of rights there are also all the as sump tions about con sti tu tional in ter pre ta tion gen er ally that are brought to bear on in ter pret ing such Bills of Rights. Con stitu tional in ter pre ta tion is in gen eral standardly pre sented as be ing dif fer ent from or di nary law in so far as it is es sen tially a mat ter of mak ing con tem po rary use of his tor i cal doc uments that are couched in gen eral terms and which must there fore be in ter preted with a large mea sure of ju di cial dis cre tion re lated in quite a loose way to re flec tions on the broad purpose of the constitution in question and how it can best be made to serve the needs of contemporary society (Barak 2005: 370-394) .
In con trast to these ten den cies, the ad van tage of a dem ocratic Bill of Rights is that its role is com pat i ble with the dem o cratic rights con tained therein, and en cour ages elector ates and pol i ti cians to take re spon si bil ity for hu man rights ar tic u la tion and im ple men ta tion in an ef fi cient and 280 fair man ner. This is su pe rior in form, and in terms of substance, has the po ten tial to go far be yond what courts will dare to do as they op er ate their hu man rights ju ris prudence un der the shadow of its per ceived il le git i macy. Moreover it al lows for the pros pect of pol i ties de vel op ing their own dis tinc tive codes and cul tures of hu man rights with out suc cumb ing to a spurious harmonisation around social and political values.
III. CONCLUDING CONCERNS
The ar gu ments against a dem o cratic Bill of Rights cen tre larger on their ques tion able ef fi cacy. Per haps, it is only the pos si bil ity that courts may strike down or re write leg is lation on hu man rights grounds that lead elected as sem blies to take hu man rights is sues se ri ously. More over, it may also be ar gued that any ju ris dic tion that adopted such a sys tem would be par a sitic on the hu man rights dis course that has been gen er ated by countless court cases in the past.
I don't ad dress these his tor i cal and em pir i cal ar gu ments here, but con cen trate in stead on the fact that a dem o cratic bills of rights, whether ef fec tive or not with re spect to human rights in gen eral, would be com pat i ble with con fin ing courts to a prop erly re stricted pro cess of le gal in ter pre tation that re cog nises that the only le git i mate source of law is ul ti mately the out come of a sys tem that ap prox i mates to equal ity of po lit i cal power. Hence a dem o cratic Bill of Rights is com pat i ble with a model of the rule of law, and of dem ocratic con trol of law which en shrines a par tic u larly im portant set of hu man rights that cluster around the idea of popular self-determination.
How ever, there are con cerns that a dem o cratic bill of rights, par tic u larly if it is adopted as part of a con sti tu tion along with pro ce dures de signed to en sure that at ten tion is given to the Bill or Rights in the pro cesses and pro ce dures of the po lit i cal sys tem. Many of these arise from the hab its 281 that courts have al ready de vel oped in re la tion to Bills of Rights. Even if it is ex plic itly stated to the con trary, courts may use dem o cratic Bills of Rights as a ba sis for 'in ter preting' or di nary law, cit ing the fact that such a Bill is ev i dence of the core en dur ing val ues of the pol ity in ques tion. This would en able courts to read down or ex pand leg is la tive acts to fit their ideas as to 'fun da men tal law'. Or, in en forc ing the pro ce dural re quire ments de signed to place hu man rights on the po lit i cal agenda in a way that gets them ad equate at ten tion, courts could readily slide from for mal to sub stan tive as sess ments so that pro ce dure that do not produce what the courts con sid ers to be ap pro pri ate out comes could be in val i dated on grounds that pre sup pose the courts su pe rior knowl edge of what con sti tutes hu man rights. More over there is a real ques tion whether hu man rights leg is la tion can be cap tured in suf fi ciently pre cise and clear terms as to ex clude the scope for cre ative ju di cial 'in ter preta tions'. This could be par tic u larly trou ble some if hu man rights leg is la tion is given quasi-con sti tu tional sta tus by not be ing sub ject to im plied re peal and tak ing pre ce dence over sub se quent in com pat i ble leg is la tion. As sess ments of the com pat i bil ity of two pieces of leg is la tion, even at the same level of specificity, has the potential to invite that degree of judicial discretion that the system is intended to exclude.
Nev er the less, mov ing from a court-cen tred to a leg is lative-cen tred sys tem of ar tic u lat ing hu man rights could in itself, by re in forc ing the countermajoritarian the sis, en courage a le gal cul ture that is more in tune with pre scrip tive le gal pos i tiv ism and its as so ci ated form of le gal in ter pre tation. Ul ti mately this is a mat ter of ju di cial eth ics that, in the na ture of the case, can be en cour aged but not re quired. 
